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Abstract
Are households more likely to be homeowners when “housing risk” is higher? We show
that homeownership rates and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios at the city level are strongly nega-
tively correlated with local house price volatility. However, causal inference is confounded by
house price levels, which are systematically correlated with housing risk in an intuitive way:
in cities where the land value is larger relative to the local cost of structures, house prices
are higher and more volatile. We disentangle the contributions of high price levels from high
volatilities by building a life-cycle model of homeownership choices. The model is able to
explain much of the cross-city dispersion in homeownership and LTV. We find that higher
price levels explain the lower homeownership, while higher risk explains the lower LTV in
high land value cities. The relationship between LTV and risk highlights the importance of
including other means of incomplete insurance in models of homeownership. Finally, we use
the model to show why regression-based inferences about the effect of risk on homeownership
are biased.
Keywords: Homeownership, Housing Risk, Land Share, Loan-to-value, Life-Cycle
JEL Classification: D91, E21, R21, R31.
1 Introduction
Are households more likely to own their home when “housing risk” is higher? There is a large
literature on how homeowners use home equity to smooth the transmission of earnings shocks into
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consumption1. In this paper, we explore how the decision to become a homeowner is influenced
by exposure to housing market risk and motives for insurance.
There is growing evidence that households may bring forward their home purchase as a hedge
against future house price fluctuations. But, an earlier purchase would often necessitate a larger
mortgage and increased risk to consumption. Using a life-cycle model, we argue that, in response
to differences in housing risk, otherwise similar households are more likely to differ in their liquid
savings than the timing of their ownership decision. Empirically, these savings differences manifest
themselves in observed variation in loan-to-value ratios (LTV). In other words, in response to
higher price risk, households do not bring forward ownership decisions (nor do households that
never own choose to become homeowners) - but rather, conditional on owning, they reduce their
LTV.
We present supporting evidence from variation across US MSAs: cities with higher house price
volatilities have lower average LTVs and also lower homeownership rates2. Based on estimates
from our model, we argue these lower ownership rates are a consequence of the higher price levels
in these risky cities. We also show that the high cross-sectional correlation between price levels
and volatilities combined with the measurement error inherent in using historical volatility as a
proxy for expected risk can lead to biases in reduced-form inferences of the effect of volatility on
homeownership.
Theoretically, when markets are incomplete there are several reasons why homeownership may
be a peculiar and attractive form of insurance against certain risks in the housing market3. In
Ben-Shahar (1998), Nordvik (2001) and Sinai and Souleles (2005), households may use home-
ownership to insure themselves against the risk of changes to the local rental price (or user-cost) of
housing. However, Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2002) suggests that if a household’s expected future
earnings are more strongly correlated with local house prices, then it already has partial insurance
through their labor earnings.4 Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) and Banks et al. (2010) propose and
1Hurst and Stafford (2004) and Hryshko et al. (2010) look at how households use mortgage refinancing decisions
and home equity, respectively, to smooth unemployment shocks and earnings shocks. Leth-Petersen (2010) finds that
household expenditure increases moderately after credit constraints are relaxed. Paciorek and Sinai (2012) finds that
the cross-sectional variance of housing consumption is lower for homeowners that have moved between cities whose
house prices are strongly correlated.
2Throughout we refer to Metropolitan Statistical Areas as “cities” and “LTV” always refers to the loan-to-value
at origination (that is, at the time of purchase). We will sometimes refer to the time-series standard deviation of the
annual changes to log house prices within a city as its “volatility”.
3Formal, direct means to insure against changes in house prices are limited (Caplin et al., 1997), and the correlation
between house prices and other financial assets is small (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002).
4Davidoff (2006) finds that households purchase less housing when they work in an industry whose workers’
income are relatively more correlated with local house prices. However, he finds very small effects of the same on the
probability of homeownership.
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find supporting evidence for a housing-ladder theory in which households who plan on eventually
owning a large house (in part because larger houses may not be available on the rental market)
are more likely to own a smaller home (rather than rent) first if they live in a risky area. This is
to partially insure themselves against increases in the price of a good in their future consumption
bundle (the larger house).
If financial constraints prevent some households from insuring themselves through owning,
there may be important welfare improvements from policies designed to make ownership “acces-
sible.” However, measuring the size or even the overall sign of the insurance motive on homeown-
ership is challenging, in part because it is difficult to isolate differences in households’ exposure to
housing risks that are independent from other factors that affect their homeownership decisions.
This study proceeds in three steps. First, we show that a substantial amount of the cross-city
variation in housing risk is systematically related to the cross-city variation in the level of prices.
We also show that households behave differently in the high-risk, high-price cities: they are less
likely to become homeowners and more likely to make a large down payment (in percentage-of-
house-value terms) when they do buy. So, secondly, we use a quantitative life-cycle model with
homeownership to disentangle the effects of higher risk from higher price levels on the life-cycle
timing of homeownership and mortgage decisions. Lastly, we show that typical regression-based
inference procedures are biased measures of the effects of risk on homeownership because they
use the ex-post, realized volatility of prices as their measure of ex-ante housing risk.
We document that both homeownership rates and average household loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
at origination at the city level, controlling for household characteristics, are strongly negatively
correlated with house price volatility. We measure local price volatility as the standard deviation
of annual house price growth rates in the city over the previous five years; this is our “ex-ante”
measure of housing risk5. In 2000, ownership rates were 60-80 percent for cities with the lowest
price risk, but only about 30-50 percent for cities with the highest. And, for mortgages originating
in 2000, mean LTV was more than five percentage points higher in the least risky cities compared
with the riskiest.
However, causal inference is confounded by house price levels, which are systematically cor-
related with housing risk in an intuitive way: in cities where the land value is larger relative to the
local cost of structures, house prices are higher and more volatile. When we look at the variation in
homeownership rates and LTV by land share (the ratio of local land values to total housing costs),
we see the same strong negative relationship. This is true even after instrumenting for possible
5“Ex-ante” in the sense that it is our measure of risk before considering the availability of assets that may provide
for some degree of partial insurance.
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endogeneity, using a measure of physical local land scarcity constructed by by Saiz (2010).
We focus on the cross-sectional dimension, rather than the time-series, for several reasons. For
one, in the data, the amount of heterogeneity both in household and price behavior is much larger
across-cities than within cities over time. For another, the land scarcity instrument offers a way
to measure the effect of higher price levels and risk (jointly) on household behavior in the cross-
section. However we cannot use it to control for endogeneity within a city over time. In this sense,
our work is complementary to much of the previous literature (e.g. Sinai and Souleles (2005)),
which exploits within-city variation in volatility (controlling for prices) to measure the insurance
motive.
In order to measure the effect of higher volatility on homeownership, we disentangle its impact
from that of higher prices by building a life-cycle model of homeownership choice. We account
separately for innovations to house prices which are correlated with city wages and those which
are not. The model has a flexible housing ladder where medium-sized housing can either be rented
or owned, which enables the model to match the relative consumption of owner-occupied to rental
housing in the average city according to land scarcity. Importantly, households have another means
of imperfectly insuring themselves in addition to homeownership: a risk-free bond.
In our setup, households have several potential reasons why they might use homeownership to
insure against housing risk. They may use homeownership to insure themselves against the risk
of changes to the rental price of housing, though their labor earnings will provide some partial
insurance. Also, the housing ladder assumption forces households that wish to live in large houses
to own them so that the model nests the theories of Banks et al. (2010) and Ortalo-Magne and
Rady (2006). Otherwise, the basic elements of our life-cycle model of homeownership are similar
to those in Cocco (2005), Li and Yao (2007) and others.
Key model parameters are chosen to match moments from the average city based on land
scarcity. Cities in the model differ ex-ante only in their land scarcity, and through land scarcity,
the stochastic processes for house prices and wages. The model endogenously captures most of
the variation by land scarcity in household behavior. Given that, we then perform counterfactual
analysis where we vary one element at a time (e.g. vary the level of prices, keeping volatility
constant). We find that most of the observed variation in homeownership across cities comes from
the observed variation in house price levels and not the variation in risk. However, variation in risk
and not prices is important for explaining the variation in LTV.
The weak effect of risk on homeownership is not because the cross-city difference in volatility
is small. Cities with land scarcity above the 75th percentile have nearly 50 percent higher standard
deviations for each of the innovations to house prices (both those that are correlated and those that
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are uncorrelated to innovations in local wages) than cities below the 25th percentile; about the same
as the percentage difference in house price levels across these cities. Absent other factors, more
risk would lead to more homeownership in the model; homeownership is the only asset available
for purchase in the model that has returns correlated with any shock. However, homeownership
has many extra costs which potentially increase with more price volatility (such as the transactions
costs for buying a house). Moreover, households also have an alternative to using homeownership
for insurance: they can accumulate precautionary, non-housing savings instead. We find that, given
the extra costs to homeownership, young households with rising income profiles would rather save
a little in liquid precautionary savings than save a lot to afford a downpayment. These extra savings
help explain the lower LTV ratios in the high risk cities.
In the model, dispersion in price levels has a much larger effect than risk on homeownership
choices through the housing ladder. For example, with a housing ladder, a household in our model
must own (rent) if it wants to live in a particularly large (small) house. Higher prices in a city de-
crease housing consumption and can therefore have a large effect on the proportion of households
that must own (rent) due to wanting to consume a large (small) amount of housing.
Patterns in the data corroborate our conclusions that differences in price levels cause differences
in home ownership rates through housing ladder effects, while differences in LTV are independent
of housing ladder effects and are instead due to risk. In the data, once we condition on whether
a household lives in an apartment or a house (a proxy for the housing ladder in the model), the
negative correlation between homeownership rates and price levels disappear. However, the nega-
tive relationship between LTV and volatility does not disappear after conditioning. The substantial
variation in homeownership rates across cities is due to the differences in price levels and the
presence of a housing ladder.
In the last section of the paper, we discuss why regression-based inferences of risk’s effect on
homeownership may be biased. Homeownership decisions in economies with transaction costs are
durable decisions. Unsurprisingly for an (S,s)-type model, not only contemporaneous prices but
also the past history of prices helps determine whether a household currently owns or not. There-
fore, homeownership rates within the city economy are also a function of the history of prices. In
many studies6, housing risk is measured using the volatility of area house prices around the time
that the homeownership rate is measured. Thus, the volatility variable picks up the history depen-
dence of homeownership on price levels. We show that not accounting for this history dependence
in regression-based inferences can lead to biases: specifically, measures of risk are incorrectly
found to be important factors in homeownership decisions. The direction of the bias depends on
6e.g. Sinai and Souleles (2005); Banks et al. (2010)
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the realized drift in house prices in the sample, with upward “trends” biasing estimates of the effect
of volatility upwards.
A key contribution of this paper is that we provide evidence of a systematic cross-city vari-
ation in homeownership and LTV using both micro and aggregate (city-level) data. Banks et al.
(2010) uses both variation within and across U.S. states and U.S.-U.K. comparisons on home-
ownership. Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) looks across developed countries for the effect of financial
market imperfections on homeownership. Albouy (2009a) and Albouy (2009b) look at the effects
of cross-city variation in taxes and amenities. Han (2010) looks at the effects of housing risks
on housing demand and homeowners’ propensity to move, using cross-city and time variation.
City-level data is appealing since it is more plausible to assume, as we do, that financial market
conditions are similar across the areas, in contrast to cross-country comparisons. But, there is
still enough plausibly exogenous, observable variation in price levels and risk across cities to find
systematic differences in household choices.
Han (2008) builds a model where homeowners may choose to accumulate more housing in
order to hedge against housing risks. Under the assumption of separable utility, she provides
conditions for when the hedging motive outweighs the household’s normal disinclination to hold
riskier assets (as in Rosen et al. (1984)). Our work expands on this contribution by adding the
option of renting and looking at homeownership and borrowing behavior jointly.
There are a few studies that examine the opposite causal direction - the effect of homeownership
and borrowing decisions on prices. Stein (1995) proposes a model where price changes have
asymmetric effects on sales due to down payment constraints. Lamont and Stein (1999) finds that
cities with high LTVs have higher rather than lower elasticities of house prices with respect to
changes in income, but the instrument they use turns out to be weak. Genesove and Mayer (1997)
finds that within a specific market (the Boston condominium market), sellers with higher LTVs
have higher expected time on the market and receive higher prices.
We do not offer a general equilibrium model of housing, nor do we deal with issues of regional
mobility7 or time-variation in the stochastic process for prices. By using the time-invariant differ-
ences in land scarcity across cities to calibrate the different price processes, we largely sidestep
issues of endogeneity that may normally arise from examining only one side of a market. Provid-
ing structural explanations for the relationship between land values and house prices and for the
existence of a housing ladder are interesting explorations that we hope the facts presented here will
7See Halket and Vasudev (2011) for a model with both, but without the changes in housing supply that we would
need here to close our model. Paciorek (2012) has a model of housing supply where the elasticities differ according
to factors like land scarcity. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) looks at inter- and intra-regional risk sharing and
home values but not homeownership.
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encourage.
The rest of this paper is as follows: Section 2 shows the striking variation in homeownership,
LTV, house prices and housing risk across U.S. cities, Section 3 presents the model, and Section
4 discusses its parametrization. Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 discusses bias in regres-
sions, and Section 7 concludes. An Online Appendix8 contains further details, some regression
results and robustness exercises.
2 Homeownership and loan-to-value ratios in the data
In this section, we present some basic facts from cross-city variation. First, we show that local
homeownership rates are decreasing in price volatility. But, we cannot draw causal inference from
this result, because local price volatilities are themselves closely correlated with local price levels.
And indeed, homeownership is also strongly negatively correlated with price levels across cities.
We then show that cities with high and volatile prices are also characterized by low LTV ratios.
So, households in these cities are less likely to own. And, when they do choose to own, their
purchases are less leveraged. But, again, it is not clear whether these outcomes are insurance-type
responses to local price volatility, or local prices, or indeed, neither of them.
Local price levels and volatilities are closely related for a simple intuitive reason. They share
the same statistical source: variation in land share, i.e. the share of the average city house price
that is attributable to the value of land (as opposed to the cost of the structure). As a result, it is not
possible to empirically disentangle the impact of price volatilities from that of price levels.
But, we do suggest a suitable instrument for land share, based on local land scarcity. We argue
that, controlling for household characteristics (including income), the impact of land scarcity on
ownership and LTV comes almost entirely through price levels and volatilities. And so, in the
following sections, we simulate a life-cycle model for cities with different values of land scarcity
(and therefore, different price levels and volatilities). We find that the model can predict the impact
of land scarcity on ownership and LTV reasonably well.
2.1 Data
This study is based on a number of data sources, with our analysis restricted to the cross-section of
20009. Ownership rates and local mean price levels (based on reported values of owned dwellings)
8available at http://www.halket.com/research/hoinsuranceappendix.pdf
9In the Online Appendix, we show that the general patterns also hold for 1990, with the exception of the systematic
patterns of LTV discussed below which have become considerably stronger since 1990.
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are constructed from the IPUMS 5 percent extract of the US 2000 census, organized by Ruggles
et al. (2010). We use two different measures of LTV ratios, taken from the American Housing
Survey (AHS) and the Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS)10; the latter is maintained by the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). Quarterly metropolitan house price indices are also
taken from the FHFA11 to estimate local price volatilities. And, our metropolitan-level average
earnings series come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) regional program12. Finally,
we use data on local land scarcity from Saiz (2010) and land share from Davis and Palumbo (2008);
we discuss these further below. Where survey data is used, we restrict our sample to households
with heads aged 21-7513, living in houses or apartments.
Throughout, we identify cities with the set of (Primary14) Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs),
of which there are 297 in the census data in 2000. However, we restrict our sample to the 221
MSAs for which FHFA price data, BEA wage data and the land scarcity instrument are available.
Of these, 42 cities are available in the metropolitan surveys of the AHS (for the estimation of lo-
cal LTV ratios) and in the Davis-Palumbo (2008) data on land shares (itself based on the AHS).
And, just 25 are available in the metropolitan MIRS LTV data - though these tend to be the most
prominent cities.
Next, we discuss the construction of variables in more detail. First, our measure of local
house price volatility is the standard deviation of log annual changes in the FHFA local price
index (measured in the first quarter of each year) over the previous five years (1995-2000).15 This
approach is based on Banks et al. (2010). We estimate wage volatility in the same way using the
BEA data.
With regards to homeownership, we present much of the evidence on cross-city correlations
between ownership rates and price levels/volatilities graphically. But, there are of course concerns
that any observed effects will simply be driven by differences in local household composition.
Therefore, we construct local ownership rates (from the census extract) that condition on local
household characteristics. Specifically, we run a probit-level regression (using the full national
sample) of an ownership dummy on various characteristics of the household head16 together with
10http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=250
11http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87. The Case-Shiller indicies distributed by Standard & Poor’s (which
is the other popular publicly available data set) cover a much smaller sample of cities.
12http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.cfm
13In the case of the AHS, age is calculated at purchase year.
14We do not aggregate these into “consolidated” areas.
15The Online Appendix contains robustness results for alternative volatility window lengths.
16Quadratic in age, education dummies (high school graduate, 1-3 years of college, 4 year + of college), gender,
marital status, dummies for number of children under 18 (1, 2, 3+), ethnicity dummies (black, hispanic) and log
household income.
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a full set of MSA effects. Then, for each MSA, we predict the ownership rate corresponding
to a household with the mean characteristcs in each dimension.17To estimate conditional local
ownership rates for a particular demographic group (e.g. an age category), we follow exactly the
same procedure, but from the beginning (i.e. even before the probit regression) restrict the sample
to the relevant demographic group.
As described above, we have two alternative sources of city-specific LTV data: the AHS and
MIRS. The AHS is a longitudinal survey, containing detailed information on housing-related vari-
ables. The metropolitan survey covers 41 MSAs, and booster samples of a further 6 MSAs (the
largest) are included in the national survey18. Of these 47 cities, we have land scarcity data on
42; and, we base our AHS analysis on this set of 42. The AHS surveys cover different MSAs in
different waves, and we therefore rely on four different waves to put together a complete sample
for cross-city analysis: the metropolitan surveys of 1998, 2002 and 2004, and the national survey
of 2001. We index observations by year of purchase (rather than survey year), because we have in-
formation on the loan amount and home price (to calculate LTV) at the purchase year. We restrict
our sample to households with mortgages, and we only study details of mortgages which were
taken out when the home was purchased. The last condition ensures that we measure the loan and
price in the same year to calculate LTV.
Like with the ownership rates, all reported local LTVs from the AHS are conditional on char-
acteristics of the household head19. Also, since the AHS samples are not large, we include all
households who purchased their home up to five years prior to the survey year (so the full dataset
spans purchase years 1993-2004) to predict LTVs in 2000. The consequent overlapping (in terms
of purchase year) of the different waves allows us to identify MSA effects. Specifically, we run
an OLS regression of LTV on household characteristics, purchase year dummies and MSA dum-
mies20. And, we predict LTV in each MSA for a household with the mean characteristics in each
17Because the regression is non-linear, the mean of our “conditional” ownership rates will not equal the mean
unconditional rate. Therefore, we recenter all observations by a constant to correct for this.
18In the national survey, the samples for cities other than these 6 are insufficient to derive city-specific statistics.
19Quadratic in age (at purchase year), education dummies (high school graduate, 1-3 years of college, 4 year +
of college), gender, marital status, dummies for number of children under 18 at purchase year (1, 2, 3+), ethnicity
dummies (black, hispanic) and log household income (deflated by CPI to 2000 dollars). To predict number of children
at purchase year, we count the number of children currently in the family who would have been under 18 at the
purchase year; of course, children born between the purchase and survey years are not accounted for.
20In this regression, we exclude a number of observations which have suspect LTV values. First, we exclude ob-
servations with home purchase prices and loans below $5,000 and LTV ratios above 1.2. Second, the AHS includes
a number of imputed values for mortgage size; we exclude these observations, because the imputations are not condi-
tional on MSA. There is also a problem with top-coding, discussed in Davis and Palumbo (2008). In the metropolitan
surveys, the top code values for house price and loan amount are calculated by city (as the mean value of the top-coded
observations), which is ideal for our purposes. But, this is not the case for the (relatively expensive) cities with booster
samples in the national survey: there, a national top code is used. In our sample, 10% of observations in New York
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dimension21, who purchased their home in 2000. To estimate “conditional” LTV for a particular
group (e.g. an age category or loan type), we follow exactly the same procedure, but from the
beginning (i.e. even before the predicting regression) restrict the sample to the relevant group.
However, there are concerns of large measurement error in the LTV data estimated from the
AHS (Lam and Kaul, 2003). And so, we also present our analysis using MIRS data. The MIRS re-
ports (among other statistics) mean LTV ratios for conventional (i.e. excluding federal-guaranteed
FHA and VA loans; see Appendix A for description of loan types) single-family loans in 25 cities,
based on a monthly survey of mortgage lenders. However, the AHS does have a number of advan-
tages for our purposes: it covers more cities, it covers non-conventional loans also, and (being a
household survey) it allows us to control for household characteristics.
Our data on land shares is taken from Davis and Palumbo (2008)22. They construct a data set
containing, by city and quarter, the average local house price, as well as the share of the local price
that is attributable to land value and structure cost, respectively, so that:
housevalue j,t = landvalue j,t+ structurevalue j,t
l j,t =
landvalue j,t
housevalue j,t
where l j,t is then the land share for city j at time t. Their land value estimates are the residual part
of house values within a city that are not explained by structure costs. Since it is partially based on
the AHS, this data is only available for 42 MSAs in our sample.
As a supply-side instrument for the share of the price attributable to land, we adopt Albert
Saiz’s (2010) measure of local land scarcity, based on physical constraints on housing supply. For
each city, this is the share of a circle around the city center, of 50km radius, that is either steeply
inclined land (at an incline of over 15%) or water.23. Saiz estimates this variable with satellite data.
Throughout this study, we apply city weights to all city-level regressions and scatter plots.
These weights correspond to the sum of the households probability weights in each city in the
are top-coded, 9% in Los Angeles, and 5% in Chicago. Our approach is to exclude all top-coded observations in the
national survey from the regression. However, we take some assurance from the fact that we control in the regression
for household characteristics that are correlated with top codes (e.g. household income, education); see the following
footnote.
21When estimating the means of household characteristics, we include in our sample all excluded observations
detailed in the previous footnote. This should partially address the problem of omitted top codes in the national survey
(we essentially predict the LTV of the top-coded observations, based on their observed characteristics).
22Their data are available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values.
23The data are available at http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~saiz/SUPPLYDATA.zip. Mian and Sufi (2011) and
Chaney et al. (2012) similarly use this data to instrument for elasticities of supply, while Paciorek (2012) builds a
model of housing supply that directly connects Saiz’s measure of land scarcity to the theoretical elasticity.
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census extract, for our chosen sample (households with heads aged 21-75, living in houses or flats).
And, all statistics from the census extract and AHS are estimated using the available household
probability weights.
2.2 Homeownership and LTV
As the first panel of Figure 1 shows, homeownership is negatively correlated across cities with
house price volatility. The predicted (OLS) effect shows ownership rates ranging from about 0.7
(for the least volatile cities) to 0.4 (for the most), with an R squared of 41 percent. But, as the
second panel shows, it is also strongly negatively correlated with price levels (see the first two
panels of Figure 1): here, the correlation is 60 percent. It should be noted that New York appears
to be an outlier in these homeownership figures. However, we propose an explanation in Section
5.
Unsurprisingly, volatilities and levels are themselves closely correlated, with a correlation of
38 percent (see Figure 2). Consequently, it is difficult to disentangle their respective effects. To
see this graphically, we isolate the portion of variation in volatilities that is uncorrelated with price
levels (i.e. the residuals from an OLS regression of volatilities on levels). In the first panel of
Figure 3, we plot homeownership against these volatility residuals: the effect is much weaker than
before, with less than half the coefficient and an R squared of under 5 percent. In the second
panel, we plot homeownership against price level residuals (from a regression on volatility). The
relationship is stronger than the one from the volatility residuals24, though still much weaker than
in Figure 1: the correlation is 23 percent.
As with homeownership, average city loan-to-value ratio at origination (LTV), as measured
by the AHS (controlling for household characteristics), is strongly negatively correlated with both
local price volatility and level (Figure 4). In the first panel, moving from the lowest to highest
price volatilities in the MSA sample, following the OLS-predicted line, LTV falls from 0.85 to
0.79, with an R squared of 19 percent. But again, unsurprisingly, in the second panel, there is also
a strong negative correlation between LTV and price levels (R squared is 50 percent).
These relationships also exist for the MIRS data, as Figure 5 shows. The correlation is much
tighter than for the AHS data: the AHS is likely to be subject to substantial sampling and reporting
error. But, the magnitudes of the effects on LTV are very similar for the two datasets: for example,
for volatility, the MIRS effect is -1.2 compared to -1.0 for the AHS. Notice that the mean LTV is
lower for the MIRS (0.77) than for the AHS (0.84) estimates. This is in part because the MIRS
sample is restricted to conventional loans only: the AHS mean for conventional loans is 0.80.
24This is perhaps unsurprising given that volatility is measured with more error than levels.
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It might be argued that these LTV patterns have a supply-side explanation, due to the intricacies
of American mortgage institutions. But, in Appendix A, we show that non-varying conforming
loan limits do not drive the observed cross-city variation in LTV, and nor do differences in local
mortgage interest rates. Also, there may be concern that the variation in LTV is merely arising from
cross-city differences in shares of mortgage-holders. Indeed, almost a quarter of homeowners (in
the 5 percent census extract of 2000) do not hold mortgages. However, it turns out that the local
mortgage share (among homeowners) is uncorrelated with the ownership rate itself, so it is not
likely to be driving our results.
To summarize, expensive and price-volatile cities tend to be characterized by low ownership
rates, but also low LTV ratios. Households in these cities are less likely to own, and when they do
buy a house, they take a bigger equity stake. But, we cannot make causal statements based on this
evidence, given the close association between local price volatility and levels.
2.3 Association between house price volatility and levels
To understand the close link between volatilities and levels, it is necessary to view house prices
as the sum of two components: land values and structure costs. Price volatilities and levels are
correlated across cities because they share the same statistical source: variation in local land shares.
In this subsection, to ensure comparability, all data (including house prices) are taken from Davis
and Palumbo (2008) - for 42 MSAs.25
Consider first the cross-city variation in price levels. The first panel of Figure 6 shows that there
is substantial variation across cities in house price levels (the range covers two log points). But,
comparing the final two panels of Figure 6, the cross-city variation in structure costs is negligible:
it is land values that are driving the large variation in house prices. Clearly then, cities with larger
land shares will have higher house prices.
Next, consider the variation in house price volatilities, i.e. the standard deviations over annual
growth rates. As with the price levels, the first panel of Figure 7 reveals large variation in volatil-
ities, ranging from 0.006 to 0.075. Since the covariance between the growth rates of land and
structure costs within a city over time is, on average, negligible, the standard deviation of house
price growth over time within a city can be approximated as follows:
σ j(ghpjt )≈ l j,tσ j(glvjt)+(1− l j,t)σ j(gscjt ), (1)
25It should be noted that the mean house price level is 16% larger in this data than our larger census-based sample,
and the mean local price volatility is also slightly larger (0.030 compared to 0.025 in the FHFA). But, the Davis and
Palumbo dataset allows us to examine the disaggregated components of local house prices.
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where glvjt , g
sc
jt and g
hp
jt are the annual growth rates of land values, structure costs and house prices,
respectively. Empirically, house price volatility, σ j(ghpjt ), is uncorrelated with the volatilities of
local land values, σ j(glvjt), and structure costs, σ j(g
sc
jt ). But, critically, Figure 7 shows that the vari-
ation in land value is an order of magnitude larger than the variation in structure costs. Therefore,
according to Equation 1, house price volatility should be strongly positively correlated with land
share - through a composition effect.
And indeed, Figure 8 confirms that both local house prices levels and volatilities are increasing
in land share26. In further results in the Online Appendix, we confirm that the effect on price
levels comes entirely through the land value component (structure costs are uncorrelated with land
share). And, the observed relationship between land share and local price volatility is entirely a
composition effect: land values are much more volatile than structure costs (in fact, land value and
structure cost volatilities are individually uncorrelated with land share).
2.4 An instrument for land share
Given the strong empirical connection between price volatility and levels, we have to disentangle
their effects on household choices with a model. One approach would be to simulate ownership and
LTV decisions in cities with different land shares. These cities are characterized by different local
price volatilities and levels (this is what matters for the simulation), and these can be estimated
from the data (by reference to their empirical relationship with land share).
The problem is that the correlation between land share and ownership or LTV cannot be con-
sidered causal a priori. Omitted variation in local productivity or housing demand should not be a
concern, because we are controlling for household income in our estimates of ownership and LTV.
But, we are worried about reverse causation from ownership/LTV to price levels/volatilities and
land share.
There are two ways to address this issue. The first is to simulate a general equilibrium model,
where land share, price levels and volatilities are all determined endogenously. However, the
determination of these housing market outcomes is not the focus of this paper, and the equilibrium
conditions would significantly complicate computation.
The second approach, which we choose, is to find a suitable instrument for land share that
will only affect ownership and LTV indirectly, i.e. via local price levels and volatilities. We opt
for a measure of local land scarcity, described in the data section above. It is based on local
geographical features, namely inclined land and water. Conditional on household income, this
instrument is unlikely to affect tenure and LTV in a significant way directly; the effect should only
26Reported land share is the mean over the 4 quarters of 2000, based on estimates from Davis and Palumbo (2008).
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come through local housing conditions (captured by price levels and volatility). The first stage is
sufficiently powerful. Figure 9 shows a strong relationship between land scarcity and land share:
a 1 percentage point increase in land scarcity is associated with a a 0.5 percentage point increase
in land share. Unsurprisingly, Figure 10 shows there are strong positive relationship between land
scarcity and price volatilities/levels as well, with correlations of 28 and 30 percent respectively.
As above, we confirm in the Online Appendix that the entire effect of land scarcity on price
levels comes through the land value component (and not structure costs). And, the effect on price
volatility is entirely a composition effect: land scarce cities have larger land shares, and local land
values are more volatile than structure costs.
3 Household choice model
In this section, we build a life-cycle model of households that work and consume in a particular
city for their entire lives. Several of the assumptions we make deserve extra attention. We severely
limit households’ access to insurance in a way which should bias the model in favor of using
homeownership as insurance: we do not allow for inter-city migration, so households cannot use
moving away from the city as source of insurance against house price changes; and the only asset
besides a house is a risk-free bond. Also, though the model is “partial-equilibrium,” rental prices
are tied to sale prices through an implied equilibrium relationship that leads to counterfactually
high rental volatility. In the model, rents will be as volatile as house prices, while in the data they
are clearly lower27. Excess volatility in rents as compared to prices will again bias the model in
favor of homeownership as insurance.
Time is discrete, and each period in the economy corresponds to one year in the data. House-
holds are born at age a= 21 and live at most to age a= 75. A household is indexed by i and lives
in a city, indexed by j, for its entire life. The city has a time-invariant land scarcity λ j.
3.1 Preferences
Households have recursive preferences of the Kreps and Porteus (1978) type28. The household
gets instantaneous utility from a non-durable consumption good c and a durable housing good h
according to:
u(ct ,ht ,at) = (c1−σt h
σ
t )/F(at)
27For instance, see Campbell et al. (2009) and Verbrugge (2008).
28These preferences nest time-separable preferences but allow for the separate consideration of inter-temporal
smoothing (savings) and smoothing across states within a given period (risk-aversion).
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The path for the family size adjustment factor, F : {21,22, ...,75} → R++, is exogenous, constant
across households of the same age and known to the household at birth.29 The household’s utility
at time t, Vt , is then given by the composite of its instantaneous utility and its future expected
utility:
Vt = [(1−β )u(ct ,ht ,at)1−φ +β (RtVt+1)1−φ ]
1
(1−φ) ,
where future expected utility is given by RtVt+1 = (Et [V
1−γ
t+1 ])
1
1−γ . γ measures risk aversion while
φ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Additive utility is a special case
where φ = γ .
Households get utility at death from bequeathing wealth,Vt+1(·,at = 75)= (bt+1+ p jt+1ht)1−σ .
3.2 Labor Earnings
Households receive labor earnings, Yt30 up until an exogenously set retirement age R, after which
they receive a pension. Yt contains three components: a deterministic life-cycle component, an
idiosyncratic component and a city-specific component. The city-specific component W jt , which
we call wages, follows a geometric random walk. The idiosyncratic component is a geometric
random walk with a transitory shock:
Yt = LitW
j
t ρ it
Lit = exp f (at)L
i
t−1ψ
i
t
W jt =W
j
t−1ν
j
t
where lnψ it ∼N (−0.5σ2ψ ,σ2ψ), lnρ it ∼N (−0.5σ2ρ ,σ2ρ) and lnν jt ∼N (µν−0.5σ2ν (λ j),σ2ν (λ j)).
The variance of innovations to wages, v jt , can differ across cities according to their land scarcity;
however all cities have common drifts. After retirement, the household gets a proportion (adjusted
29Attanasio et al. (1999); Gourinchas and Parker (2002); Cagetti (2003); Li and Yao (2007) each let family size
affect a household’s discount factor. In Gourinchas and Parker (2002); Li and Yao (2007), the life cycle profile for
family size is deterministic and homogeneous across households of the same age. Attanasio et al. (1999); Cagetti
(2003) let the profiles vary by education. Browning and Lusardi (1996) have a stochastic process for family size (see
their paper for more references). Gervais (2002); Campbell and Cocco (2003); Li and Yao (2007); Diaz and Luengo-
Prado (2008) all use Cobb-Douglas preferences over non-durable consumption and housing which are consistent with
evidence from Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011) that housing expenditure shares are approximately constant across
cities.
30For ease of notation, we suppress some variables’ dependence on the household and city specific labels, i and j
respectively, when such dependence is or will become obvious.
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for growth in the city) of its final salary, Yt = ζLiRW
j
t . All households’ income is taxed at a rate ty.
3.3 Housing Market
At any time, homes may either be rented (τ it = 0) or owned (τ it = 1), but not both simultaneously.
There is a housing ladder which forces households to choose rented housing from the set Hr and
owner-occupied housing from the set Ho.
Housing can be bought at a unit price p jt , which contains two components - one correlated with
labor earnings and one uncorrelated with labor earnings:
p jt = Q
j
tW
j
t
where Q jt = Q
j
t−1ε
j
t and lnε
j
t ∼ N (−0.5σ2ε (λ j),σ2ε (λ j)). The variance of innovations to the
uncorrelated component, ε jt , like those of the correlated component, differs across cities; city-
specific drifts remain common31.
An owner pays proportions, tp and δ j, of the value of the house each period towards property
taxes and maintenance, respectively. The housing maintenance means houses do not depreciate
and the maintenance required may vary across cities. A household may not “build on” to its house;
to adjust the size of an owner-occupied house, it must sell its current one and buy a new house.
Each time a household buys a house, it pays a fraction θb of the value of the house as a transaction
cost.
A renter pays only the spot rental price per unit of housing s jt , which we set so that a risk-neutral
landlord would be indifferent between renting or selling the house, subject to paying income tax
on its rental income:
s jt =
tp+δ j+ rb−µν1+rb
1− ty p
j
t
where rb is the risk-free interest rate at which households and landlords can borrow.
Households have three potential motives for owning: renting is higher than the user-cost of
owning due to the taxation of rental income, the housing ladder restricts the size of rental housing,
and the several insurance motives.
31Flavin and Yamashita (2002); Campbell and Cocco (2003); Cocco (2005); Yao and Zhang (2005); Li and Yao
(2007); Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) all assume shocks to house prices are permanent.
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3.4 Assets
Besides housing, the only other financial asset for the household is a risk-free one period bond,
bit+1, which pays rl to savers but costs (net) rb > rl to borrow. Households may borrow at this rate,
subject to a borrowing constraint. Housing is the sole form of collateral. We model this by giving
households a home equity line of credit.32 The LTV at the time of purchase is simply the ratio:
− bit
p jt hit
.
When purchasing a home, households can borrow up to (1−d) of the value of the house, where
d is the down payment constraint. Thereafter, as long as they continue to be homeowners, agents
may borrow up to (1−d) of the value of the house. They may also choose to roll over their debt
after making an interest payment. So at any time, the borrowing constraint is:
bit+1 ≥min{−(1−d)τ it p jt hit ,(1−1m)bit},
where 1m is an indicator variable which equals one if the household chooses to move in the pe-
riod.33
If the household chooses to sell its home, it must pay off all existing debt, though another
loan can be taken out if another home is purchased. A household that does not have positive total
cash-in-hand (housing wealth plus financial wealth plus current income) will not be able to pay
off the mortgage it has (the debt it owes) on its home and will not choose to move in this period.
We do not allow the household to choose to default (see Jeske and Krueger (2005) for a model
with mortgage default), but households can default implicitly by dying. After retirement, we do
not allow households to take out new loans, but they may continue with their old loan34. This
effectively ensures in our calibrated economy that all households reach age 75 debt free.
Newborn households are “born” with no housing but they draw their initial wealth from a
distribution Πb, which is a probability distribution on R+.
32We also call this a mortgage throughout.
33This borrowing constraint is different from the more typical one which restricts borrowing to be weakly less than
some percentage of the house value (bit+1 ≥ −(1− d)τ it p jt hit ). With risky house prices, for an agent near the typical
borrowing constraint, a fall in the value of a house results in a "call on the mortgage principle" - the agent must reduce
the amount borrowed. If house price volatility is large enough, the effective down payment constraint (the amount the
agent could borrow and still be able to repay in any state of the world next period) may be much tighter than the actual
(d).
34That is, a retired household’s borrowing constraint is bit+1 ≥min{0,(1−1m)bit}.
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3.5 Household’s Problem
The problem of the household is to choose consumption, house size and ownership, and savings,
given its permanent and transitory earnings components, housing and assets at the beginning of the
period and prices, subject to budget, borrowing, and choice-set constraints and the initial condition
and laws of motion for Q jt ,W
j
t (which we do not repeat below) for all variables:
V (at ,Lt ,ρt ,bt ,τt−1ht−1;Q jt ,W
j
t ,λ j) = max
ct ,ht ,bt+1,τt
[(1−β )u(ct ,ht ,at)1−φ
+β (RV (at+1,Lt+1,ρt+1,bt+1,τtht ;Q jt+1,W
j
t+1,λ j))
1−φ ]
1
(1−φ)
s.t.
ct+bt+1+ht((1− τt)s jt + τt p jt (δ j+ tp+1+1mθb))≤ bt(1+ r)+Yt(1− ty)+ht−1τt−1p jt
bit+1 ≥min{−(1−d)τ it p jt hit ,(1−1m)bit}
r =
rl ifbt ≥ 0rb ifbt < 0
c≥ 0 τtht ∈ {0,Ho} (1− τt)ht ∈ {0,Hr} τt ∈ {0,1}
4 Parametrization
Parameters that vary across cities in the model are those indexed by j and differ ex ante according
to their land scarcity, λ j. All other parameters remain constant across cities. In this section, we
discuss the calibration/estimation of some key parameters; the calibration of the remainder are
discussed in the Appendix (see Table 1 for their values). These key parameters are all those that
vary across cities and the housing ladder parameters in Hr and Ho. These are estimated in three
steps.
1. We initialize the model so that the cross-section of relative prices and wages in a particular
year, 2000, is the same in the model as in the data. We assume σ jν ,σ
j
ε , p
j
2000,W
j
2000,δ
j vary
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across cities in the model according to the same (linear) relationship estimated in the data.
σ jν = αν +βνλ j (2)
σ jε = αε +βελ j (3)
p j2000 = αp+βpλ j (4)
W j2000 = αw+βwλ j (5)
δ j = (1−αδ −βδλ j)δh (6)
We estimate the parameters of these functions using land scarcity, as discussed in Section 2
(see below for more detail). Further details about the estimates of the α and β coefficients
can be found in the Online Appendix. The δ j are set using the relationship between land
share and maintenance described below. This entire step can be done without computing the
household’s problem.
2. We simulate a set of cities with different land scarcities, each with 200,000 households.
Each household is born at some date at most 54 years before 2000. For each city, we draw
realizations of the annual innovations to prices and wages so that they equal their 2000
relative value in 2000.
3. We choose the parameters in the housing ladder so that specific moments in the simulated
model data best match those in the data in 2000. The values of the housing ladder parame-
ters are found by repeatedly computing the household’s problem for different values of the
parameters (and repeating step 2) and choosing the pair that provided the best match.35
4.1 Housing
We assume that a city’s housing supply is fixed and that homeowners pay a maintenance cost
to replace depreciated housing capital. So, the (growth-adjusted) relationship between housing
depreciation and housing investment is (abusing notation)
δh =
Ih−∆(pH)
pH
For the aggregate value of housing, pH, we use non-farm owner-occupied housing from NIPA’s
Historical-Cost Net Stock of Residual Fixed Assets table. Investment in housing is computed using
35A simulated method-of-moments computed over a grid of potential parameter values.
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non-farm owner-occupied housing from NIPA’s Historical-cost Investment in Residential Fixed
Assets. This gives δh = 0.017. These values from NIPA are the value of the structures and do not
include the value of land. For any city, j, 1−αδ −βδλ j is the share of structure costs in house
value. So for each city, we set δ j = (1−αδ − βδλ j)δh, where αδ = 0.306 and βδ = .470 are
the intercept and slope, respectively, of the linear relationship estimated between land share and
land scarcity (see the Online Appendix for further details). The rent-to-price ratio in the cities will
therefore vary slightly with land scarcity due to changes in δ j.
We allow households to choose any size rental up to a maximum: Hr = (0,hr]. We impose a
minimum owner-occupied house size but no other restriction: Ho = [ho,∞). We use the model to
set ho and hr so that cities with the mean land scarcity have an average homeownership rate in the
model matches the fitted homeownership rate at the mean land scarcity in the data and so that the
mean ratio of owner-occupied house sizes to rental house sizes in the model matches the fitted ratio
(in square feet) in the data. Matching the two moments, the homeownership rate and the relative
housing sizes, identifies the two parameters uniquely. We do not have a formal proof but casual
introspection (if ho increases, then hr must decrease to keep the ownership rate constant, but hr
must increase to keep the relative house size ratio constant) and all computation thus far confirms
it.
4.2 Prices
To estimate the parameters in the price processes, we match year/city panels of house prices (from
the FHFA) and average wages (from the BEA). These data are used to calculate, for each city,
a covariance matrix of annual growth rates of wages and house prices over 1995-2000. We have
assumed in the model that ν jt affects prices and wages equally. So we could use either wage growth
variance or price-wage growth covariance as alternative estimates for σ2ε (λ j). The mean (across
cities) wage growth variance (0.00021) is almost twice as large as the mean price-wage growth
covariance (0.00011). However, if we restrict our attention to the thirty largest cities in the sample,
the two statistics do match (they are both 0.00015). So we choose to use the wage growth variances
to estimate αν and βν .
We run OLS regressions on equations (2) to (5), with land scarcity as the independent variable,
and a range of dependent variables: local price volatility (the standard deviation over annual growth
rates, 1995-2000), wage volatility, price level and wage level. We take local wage levels from the
BEA data of 2000, and estimate price levels (as discussed above) from the 5% census extract of
2000.
Conditional on αν and βν , house prices are used to estimate αε , βε and βp. Due to the homo-
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geneity in our model and since we only set the housing ladder parameters in a later step, we are
free to normalize αw and αp. Table 2 shows some moments for the key parameters. The results
from the instrumental variable regressions are available in the Online Appendix.
5 Results
5.1 Moments in models and data
Table 3 shows the results from the average city by land scarcity compared to the data. Since the
house size parameters were chosen so that the model matched the data on the homeownership
rate and relative house sizes, it should not be surprising that we attain a very good fit along these
lines. The model also matches the data well if we consider only those households 65 years old and
younger which, given the model’s relatively simple characterization of post-retirement life, is also
not surprising. Table 4 shows that the model also matches the profile of homeownership relatively
well, though there are too few young and too many middle-aged homeowners.
Though no parameters were chosen to match the LTV rates (conditional on taking a loan), the
model is able to match the data from the AHS relatively well, however it is somewhat lower. This is
perhaps a result of only having one non-housing asset in the model. In the data, we do not observe
the mortgage net of other financial assets, which is the relevant variable in the model.
Table 5 shows the slopes of linear regressions of city-level homeownership and LTV on land
scarcity in the data and in the model. The model is able to explain much of the difference in
homeownership and LTV across cities. A ten percentage point increase in land scarcity implies a
decrease in homeownership of 2.5 and 2.0 percentage points in the data and model, respectively.
Likewise, the same increase in land scarcity implies a decrease in LTV of 0.7 and 0.6 percentage
points in the data and model, respectively. Generally speaking, the difference in homeownership
rates across land scarcity declines with age, a pattern which the model matches.36
The model also explains the difference in LTV over cities for the younger age groups (matching
well up to age 45) but breaks down thereafter. As in the data, the relationship between LTV and
land scarcity becomes less negative with age, turning positive for the older ages (although the
coeffecients are not significant for these ages). The shortcoming of not being able to observe net
financial assets in the data is likely to be more acute for older households that have accrued savings,
and perhaps explains why the increase in the coefficients is sharper in the model than in the data.
Fortunately, late-life LTV figures are relatively inconsequential for the cross-city dispersion: in
36This may explain why Sinai and Souleles (2005) finds a positive effect on ownership from the interaction between
mobility (which is negatively correlated with age) and rent volatility (which is positively correlated with land scarcity).
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the data, 80 percent of new loans are taken by households under 50 and 97 percent by households
under 65. Thus the restriction that, in the model, households over 65 are not allowed to take new
loans is probably not important for the LTV results.
5.2 Counterfactuals
High land scarcity cities differ exogenously in several important ways from low land scarcity cities
in the model. High land scarcity cities have lower rent-to-price ratios in the model because struc-
tural depreciation as a percentage of the house value is smaller (this is also true in the data). High
land scarcity cities have higher idiosyncratic house price variance and a higher variance in the in-
novations to the correlated house price - wages process. These cities also have higher prices but
also, as a mitigating factor, higher wages.
To disentangle these different contributions, we simulate five variations to the baseline model
economy, each time allowing only one of the parameters to vary with land scarcity; all other
parameters are kept at their respective mean land scarcity values. In two of the counterfactuals, we
allow the variances to vary by land scarcity according to equations 2 and 3, respectively. In a third
and fourth, we simulate cities with different land scarcities so that they have relative prices or wages
in the year 2000 that vary according to equations 4 and 5, respectively. In the final counterfactual,
we vary the maintenance in cities according to equation 6. Table 6 shows the coefficient from
regressing homeownership and LTV on land scarcity from each of the counterfactual economies,
so highlighting each parameter’s contribution to the cross-city differences generated by the model.
The largest contributor to the cross-city dispersion in homeownership is dispersion in the level
of house prices. However, higher risk explains why high land scarcity cities have lower LTVs.
Changes in risk do affect homeownership slightly. But the results show that higher risk reduces
homeownership; households, on balance, do not use homeownership to insure themselves against
housing risk.
5.2.1 Differences in price levels and homeownership
Differences in prices create differences in homeownership through the housing ladder. In both
the data and the model, households live in larger houses when they live in cheaper cities, and the
difference in sizes is larger for owners than for renters37. So, households in cheaper cities, living
37The square-footage difference in the data (using the AHS, all reported differences statistically significant) be-
tween the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile city by land scarcity is 21 percent, while in the model the size
difference is 19 percent of the average size house. For owners, the difference in house size is 15 percent and 17
percent in the data and model respectively. For renters the difference is 13 percent and 9 percent, respectively.
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in larger houses, are more likely to choose to own due to a binding maximum rental constraint,
while households in the expensive cities are more likely to rent due to a binding minimum owner-
occupied house size constraint. Likewise, differences in wages work similarly, though the total
effect is smaller. Everything else equal, higher wages in the high land scarcity cities leads to
higher housing consumption and, due to the housing ladder, higher homeownership (consistent
with findings from Coulson and Fisher, 2009).
In our simulations, households respond to lower prices by increasing housing consumption,
which leads to higher homeownership due to the housing ladder. Therefore, households who ad-
just their tenure decision in response to local prices are likely doing so to adjust their housing
consumption. And so, holding housing consumption fixed, we should expect to see no effect of
price on tenure decisions.
In the data, a critical margin of adjustment in housing consumption is between apartments and
houses.38According to our census sample, almost all houses (85 percent) are owned and almost
all apartments (87 percent) are rented. Interestingly though, among owned properties, LTV ratios
(predicted for 2000 from the AHS) are almost identical across dwelling types: 0.84 for houses and
0.86 for apartments.39
In Figure 13, we plot the relationship between conditional homeownership rates and prices
across MSAs, by dwelling type: full sample, houses only and apartments only. The estimated effect
of prices on ownership rates is more than three times as large for the full sample as the houses-
only sample. And, the relationship for apartments is actually positive. Clearly then, adjustments
in housing consumption (in this case, between dwelling types) play an important part in driving
the overall price-ownership relationship. Also, Figure 13 suggests that New York is an outlier in
Figure 1 because it has more apartments per unit of housing than the typical city with its land
scarcity.
In contrast to the tenure choice, the LTV decision (conditional on ownership) is not strongly
related to housing consumption. This suggests the mechanism driving these LTV results is inde-
pendent of the housing ladder (instead, we argue below that insurance motives are important). In
Figure 14, we plot LTV-price relationships for the full sample, and separately for houses and apart-
38Based on US census data, we have defined an “apartment” as a housing unit that shares its structure with one or
more other housing units; a “house” is a single-unit structure. Note that “houses” need not be entirely detached from
other structures: a housing unit attached to another unit by a full-height dividing wall, that goes from ground to roof,
is here defined as a “house”.
39These two statistics are means of local conditional LTVs across the 42 cities in our sample (for houses and apart-
ments respectively), where the conditional LTVs are estimated as described in Section 2.1. Controlling for household
characteristics (as we do in this procedure) is not trivial because of the omitted top-coded observations (see Section
2.1 for details).
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ments. This time, the effects of log prices are negative for both dwelling types; they are also very
similar in magntiude: -0.060 for houses and -0.064 for apartments. It is clear that composition
effects are not driving the relationship for LTV.
5.2.2 Differences in risk and LTV
Higher risk has a small effect on homeownership, but accounts for all of high land scarcity cities’
lower LTV. This is for two reasons. Firstly, households save more in the high variance cities, in part
due to higher price volatility but also due to high wage volatility. Renting is a partial hedge against
falls in wages that are correlated with rents and prices. However, households will not completely
insure themselves against falls in wages through rental housing, since doing so would distort their
housing consumption greatly. So households also hold more total wealth in the high co-variance
economies. This extra total wealth leads to lower LTVs when the households do decide to purchase
a house.
Model households do view homeownership as a potential source of insurance; but it is highly
imperfect variety of insurance. Housing comprises about 25 to 30 percent of expenditures in the
model, so households would like homeownership to comprise about the same amount in their total
wealth portfolio (including human capital) for insurance purposes. However, most renters would
have to leverage their financial wealth greatly to buy a home, leaving them near the borrowing
constraint and particularly exposed to large falls in house prices, which are more likely in risky
cities. Large falls in prices can leave their budget sets particularly small. So households in riskier
cities defer housing purchases until they can afford to buy the house with lower leverage.40 This
is consistent with our finding that the share of homeowners that purchase their house without a
mortgage is not correlated with risk (or land scarcity) in the data: households with this much
financial wealth in the model are not troubled by the borrowing constraint.
There are also transactions costs: more risk leads to more mobility and lower expected du-
rations in any given house. Since adjusting owner-occupied housing is costly, this decreases the
value to owning and thus homeownership. For instance, in the σε counterfactual, the homeown-
ership rate for households under 35 in a typical low land scarcity city (25th percentile) economy
is 2 percentage points higher than its counterpart at the 75th percentile. If we eliminate transac-
tions costs, the (negative) slope of homeownership with respect to land scarcity halves in both risk
counterfactuals. In other words, households optimally prefer to self-insure with a risk-free bond,
which does not have transactions costs, does not distort the intratemporal consumption bundle and
40These are two sides of similar coins: households worry about the risk that their house will be expensive at the
time of purchase and also the risk that their house falls in value after buying it.
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does not compel asset-poor households (which young would-be homeowners largely are) to over-
leverage themselves, rather than insure with housing even though housing is the only asset whose
return is correlated with the some of the risks the household faces.
Households do own slightly larger houses in the higher variance economies but there is little
evidence of a housing ladder effect as discussed in Banks et al. (2010). Their theory is that house-
holds that expect to consume more housing than a rental can provide later in life anticipate owning
later in life and therefore households in economies with high risk will seek to insure themselves
against the risk that prices may be high in the future, when they are likely to own a large house, by
purchasing a small house earlier.
Theoretically, the overall strength of the “ladder effect” is particularly dependent on the nature
of the housing ladder assumptions. A very rigid ladder (where, say, the minimum owner-occupied
size equaled the maximum rental available, such as in Banks et al. (2010)) can potentially have
large average effects early in the life cycle. However, a rigid ladder with a low maximum rental size
would not enable our model to match the relative housing consumption of renting versus owning
households seen in the data. More importantly, if the ladder effect were large, new homeowners
should be willing to buy housing with lower down payments in order to own sooner in riskier
cities. From the price level counterfactual, we do see that households would opt for higher leverage
purchases in expensive cities in order to climb the housing ladder. If more risk also led households
try and climb the ladder faster via larger loans, the model would not be able to match the higher
down payments (lower LTVs) in land scarce cities in the data.
Finally, the effect of differing maintenance costs is small: maintenance after all is only part of
the cost of housing. Relatively high maintenance in low land scarcity economies makes owner-
occupancy relatively more attractive as it increases the tax wedge in the user-cost formula, leading
to very slightly higher homeownership rates and LTV ratios.
6 History dependence and regression-based inference
A household’s decision to become a homeowner is a durable decision. The durability of this de-
cision means that at the aggregate (city) level, homeownership rates are not only a function of
contemporaneous prices but also of lagged prices. Not accounting for this history dependence in
regression-based inference can lead to biases which make measures of volatility appear as impor-
tant factors in homeownership.
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6.1 The history dependence of homeownership rates
We can use the model to illustrate this history dependence, though the point carries in any setting
where housing is a durable choice (for instance, whenever there are transaction costs). We preform
the following experiment. We take four cities (two sets of two) that are each ex-ante identical (all
four have the have the mean value of land scarcity). In the first set, we give one city a positive price
shock in period one and a twin city the same positive price shock in period five41, so that prices
are identical from year five onwards. In the second set, we apply the same magnitude and timing
of shocks, though negative rather than positive.
Figure 15 plots the price path for each city, the implied measured volatility using a 5 year
rolling window42. and the path of homeownership in each city. This figure shows two important
characteristics. First, homeownership rates do not instantaneously fully incorporate the changes in
prices (a “delay effect”). Second, there is an asymmetry in the speed with which a city adjusts to
shocks. Positive shocks feed into homeownership rates faster than negative shocks.
The model is homothetic, so a positive shock to prices and wages is equivalent to a shock which
proportionally reduces (towards zero) all households’ savings or borrowings. Renters with a lot of
financial wealth feel “wealthier” (“poorer”) after a negative (positive) shock to prices and wages
and so expect to consume more (less) non-durable and housing goods over the rest of their lives. In
particular, they may now expect to cross (or not cross) one of the housing consumption boundaries
over their life cycle. In general, households want to turn this new-found wealth into consumption
over the rest of their lives. The pivotal change in housing consumption (with respect to the housing
ladder constraints) may not be until later in their lives. So homeownership rates take some time to
fully react to the change in prices. Wages also go down (up) though, so young, renting households
with little financial wealth who are years away from becoming owners are hardly effected by
the shock. Eventually, as existing households exit the model and newborn households enter, the
ownership rate begins to revert back to its steady-state level.
The shocks have asymmetric effects due to the transactions cost. A negative (positive) shock
expands (contracts) the contemporaneous consumption set of the household. In particular, a nega-
tive shock means that a household that wanted to presently own but could not due to the borrowing
constraint might now be able to (and vice versa). Most households in such a position are young
households, as they have much less wealth on average. But younger households also expect to
move more often than older households due to higher earnings uncertainty and lower wealth. So
41In each case, we use the shock that is correlated with wages, ν jt .
42Sinai and Souleles, 2005 and Banks et al., 2010 use a nine-year window and a five-year window, respectively, in
their regressions.
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they find the transactions cost of buying a house more onerous. So whereas an increase in house
prices will strictly prevent some households from becoming a homeowner in the near future and
therefore has a more immediate effect on homeownership rates, a decrease in prices merely allows
some households to choose to become owners - a choice they may defer for a while due to mobil-
ity expectations. Put another way: an increase in prices may bound some households away from
owning which means they must rent, whereas a decrease can slacken the borrowing constraint for
some households which means they can own.
6.2 Regression-based inference
The delay effect and the asymmetric effect have important implications for inferences from within-
city variation (across time) in price volatility. The delay effect means that cities with the same
prices and same stochastic processes may still have different homeownership rates because their
price histories differ. This can be clearly seen in the first panel of Figure 15, where after year
five, the homeownership rates differ across cities that received the same shock at different points in
time. The asymmetric effect means that if one were to look at absolute price changes (or squared
price changes) the delay effect would not average out.
There is obviously measurement error in using realized volatility measured from recent histor-
ical prices as the proxy for ex-ante risk. From the durability and asymmetry effects we know that
(1) the history of prices is an important explanatory variable for homeownership rates and that (2)
volatility measures, which use squared historical prices, will be correlated with contemporaneous
homeownership rates, even if in the true DGP risk is not. In other words, even if the latent vari-
able, risk, is not important for homeownership rates, the measurement error part of volatility is
important.
Lastly, the amount of bias that arises from using historical volatility as a measure of risk can
vary a lot. Even the sign can change. There are many possible permutations depending on the
window size used for measuring volatility and the difference in the timing of shocks.
Take the two cities in the above example that each receive positive shocks, one in period one
and the other in period five. The city that receives the shock in period five is “riskier” (from the
perspective of the econometrician using a five year window for volatility) for the years five through
nine than the city receiving the shock in period one. A panel regression of homeownership rates
on prices and volatility using years 5 through, say, 20 would find a positive coefficient on volatility
(and in this case, the coefficient on prices would not be identified as there would be no cross-
sectional variation in prices). In other words, a regression with a sample that contained a period
of above-trend price growth for many cities, where the timing of this above trend growth differed
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over cities, could easily have an upwardly biased coefficient on volatility. Likewise, a regression
with a sample period with differentially timed, below-trend price growth for many cities would
have downwardly biased coefficients on volatility.43
7 Conclusion
There is significant variation across cities in homeownership, LTV, house prices and housing risk.
Much of the variation in house prices and housing risk has a common source - variation in the
value or scarcity of land. This makes regression-based methods of separating the effects of risk
from prices on household behavior difficult and inconclusive. Instead, we build a life-cycle model
of homeownership which we match to the mean city in our data.
The model is able to explain much of the cross-city variation in homeownership and LTV and
matches the variation in the data particularly well for younger households. We find that it is the
relatively higher prices in cities with scarce land which causes their lower homeownership rates,
while it is their relatively higher volatility that causes homeowners in these cities to borrow less.
So, we do not find that more risk leads households to own more. Instead, more risk leads to higher
reliance on non-housing savings. This result highlights the importance of including other means
of imperfect insurance in asset allocation models with incomplete markets.
The main question explored in this paper concerns homeownership and insurance. Several of
the facts developed in this paper - the relationships between land values, land scarcity and house
prices, and between housing availability (the housing ladder) and homeownership - beg further
examination and a full structural explanation. It would also be worth using a general equilibrium
version of the model to examine the different local effects of aggregate (country-wide) shocks.
Finally, it would be useful to explore whether land scarcity, via LTV, can help explain any recent
geographical patterns in mortgage defaults.
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A Robustness to Supply-side effects
A.1 Background
First, we briefly outline the different types of mortgage available in the United States 44. Mortgage
loans may either be conventional or non-conventional. To qualify for a conventional loan, house-
holds must pass credit and PITI (income) tests. If they cannot afford a threshold down payment
(often as high as 20%), they will also have to purchase PMI (private mortgage insurance) to qualify
for a conventional loan. Non-conventional loans are guaranteed by the government, through the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Department of Veteran Affairs (VA). They tend to be
more appropriate for households who require a large LTV.
44For more detail see, e.g., Caplin et al. (1997).
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Conventional loans may either be conforming or nonconforming. Loans are conforming if they
fall below a dollar threshold, which varies with time. Until 2008, this threshold was nationally
uniform (our sample excludes years after 2008). Conforming loans are subject to cheaper rates,
because they are more liquid: Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac will provide guarantees enabling a
lender to sell them to the secondary market.
A.2 Conforming and non-conforming loans
Here, we consider the impact of conforming loan limits. The existence of this nationally uniform
loan limit may well be responsible for our LTV result. In more expensive cities, the conforming
loan limit is more likely to bind. As a result, households will be forced to make a larger down
payment (to qualify for the cheaper rates on conforming loans). And, this will yield a negative
correlation between price and LTV (and consequently, between price risk and LTV too). If the
conforming loan limit is driving our results, then the effect should be stronger the closer the loan
size is to the conforming loan limit: increases in land value would be less likely to lead to increases
in loan value if that means the household will go over the conforming loan size limit.
To test whether the loan limit is driving this effect, we check the LTV-price level/volatility
correlation in samples delineated by the ratio of loan size to loan limit (restricting our attention
to households with conventional mortgages). It turns out, though, that the correlation is strongly
negative (especially) for loans well below the limit and less so for loans close to the limit. So, we
conclude that the loan limit cannot be responsible for the correlation.
The results are reported in Table 7. In each case, observations are at household-level, and the
dependent variable is LTV. The regressor of interest is price volatility in Panel A and log house
price in Panel B. Also included are a range of household-level controls (see table notes) and a full
set of purchase year fixed effects (we only include households that purchased their home between
1990 and 2004).
Regressions are disaggregated into samples delineated by loan-to-limit ratio. Also, the sample
is restricted to households with conventional mortgages (we are interested in the impact of the
conforming loan limit). The loan-to-limit ratio for each sample is reported at the top of the columns
(0-0.25, 0.25-0.5, 0.5-0.75, 0.75-1, 1-1.25, 1.25-1.5 and >1.5).
The effect on LTV is negative in all samples for both price volatility and levels. For volatility
(Panel A), the effect is very large and statistically significant for the 0-0.25 sample (-4.9) and the
0.25-0.5 sample (-1.6). But, the effects for all the other samples fall below 0.8 and are statistically
insignificant. The effects around the conforming loan limit (0.75-1 and 1-1.25) actually tend to
be smaller than elsewhere. This suggests that the negative effect is not being driven by some
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interaction with the conforming loan limit. The patterns are very similar for price level in Panel B,
though more of the samples are statistically significant.
A.3 Local variation in effective interest rates
An alternative hypothesis is that banks subject households in riskier cities to higher mortgage
interest rates - and this could explain the lower ownership rate in these cities. Similarly, it could
explain why households in these cities choose to take out smaller loans (relative to home value).
Interest rates may vary across cities because of differences in state-level regulation.
However, it turns out that effective interest rates45 are actually lower in expensive/risky cities.
This is illustrated by Figure 16, using data from the MIRS on 25 major cities. There is a strong
negative correlation across cities between the interest rate and both price risk and level (R squared
is 40-50% in each case). The interest rate varies from 7% in the most expensive/risky cities to 8%
in the least. And so, this cannot explain why ownership rates and LTV ratios are also lower in
expensive cities.
B Parametrization
B.1 Household life-cycle and preferences
We calibrate the discount factor, β = 0.95, housing’s share in the utility function, σ = 0.3 follow-
ing Favilukis et al. (2010) and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, φ = 5,
following Piazzesi et al. (2007). Estimates of risk aversion vary widely, particularly when the
parameter is separately identified from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Some studies
have point estimates with γ = 20 or higher but with equally large confidence intervals (see Attana-
sio and Weber (1989); Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003), and, for values over 100, Yogo
(2006)). Since such a large value of γ would imply an outlandish level of precautionary savings
in our model, we choose γ = 3, which is well within the more traditional range of two to five that
most studies prefer (see Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010); Hryshko et al. (2010); Li and Yao
(2007)).
45“Effective” because it accounts for any up-front fees
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B.1.1 Family size equivalence
We collect data from the period 1970-1993 in the CPS. We control for year effects by using year
dummies. The family size profile is generated by the following regression:
Fiat =
81
∑
k=21
βk1k+
1993
∑
t ′=1970
βt ′1t ′+ εiat
where 1k is a year dummy which takes on value 1 when a= k, and 1t ′ is the year dummy that takes
on value 1 when t ′ = t.
Figure 17 shows the profiles of family size from the CPS. Family size increases sharply when
the household is young, peaking at age 39.
In order to adjust the household’s housing and consumption stream, we use a household equiva-
lence scale. The objective of an equivalence scale is to measure the change in consumption needed
to keep the welfare of the family constant as the family size varies. Note that using per capita
consumption assumes that the family converts consumption expenditure into utility flow follow-
ing constant returns to scale. Lazear and Michael (1980) point to the existence of family goods,
economies of scale and complementarities, which are all factors that they show to be significant.
We therefore use a household equivalence scale that is not constant returns to scale. Table B.4 lists
some equivalence scales. L-M stands for Lazear and Michael (1980), US Dept of Commerce refers
to US Department of Commerce (1991) and F-V&K stands for Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger
(2007). Lazear and Michael’s scale takes greater account of common or public goods, so that
the impact of family size is less then other equivalence scales (compare, for instance, Orshansky
(1965)). We use the housing equivalence scale used by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007).
All households in the model economy have the same life-cycle profile of family size, which is
set to the average family size at each age in the CPS. To account for non-integer family sizes, we
assume that the adjustment factor is linear within the family sizes specified in Table (B.4). Figure
17 shows the equivalent, normalized family size over the life cycle.
B.2 Assets
We set the down payment requirement, d = .1. We set the transaction cost of buying, θb = .08,
within the range typically chosen by the literature (Martin (2003); Fisher and Gervais (2011)). We
set the interest rates rl = .04. The average difference between a 30 year fixed rate mortgage and the
30 year U.S. Treasury bond is between 1 percent and 2 percent for 1977-2010 so we set rb = .06.
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B.2.1 Initial wealth distribution
We calibrate the wealth distribution of newborns using the distribution of wealth among 21-25
year olds in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) waves from 1989-2001. We drop top-coded
observations and households with negative wealth and students from the sample and use the sample
weights provided by the SCF. We parametrize the initial wealth distribution as an exponential
distribution. That gives us one parameter that we have to match.
f (b0) = λwe−λwb0
where b0 is the initial wealth, and λw is the parameter to estimate in the exponential distribution.
We estimate λw by matching the mean of the initial wealth distribution.
λw =
1
b0
This gives us λw = 0.00589. We convert the initial wealth distribution in the data to model terms
by scaling by the ratio of average labor earnings at age 21 in the model to average labor earnings
at age 21 in the data.
B.3 Taxes
There are two forms of taxes in the model economy - income tax, ty, and property tax, tp. Piketty
and Saez (2007) uses public use micro-files of tax return data from the Internal Revenue Service,
which have the advantage of being aggregated to the household level already. The income tax rate
we choose, ty = 0.2, is in the same range that they compute for the US economy46.
We use data from the IPUMS 1990 5 percent sample. The variables used are the amount of
property tax paid and the estimated value of the house. We remove top-coded variables from the
sample, and consider only owner-occupiers. Sample observations are weighted using the house-
hold weights given in the data set. The weighted average of the ratio of the amount of property tax
paid to the estimated value of the house is 0.012. In the model we set tp = 0.01.
B.4 Earnings Process
We parametrize the idiosyncratic and age-profile portion of the household’s earnings following
Halket and Vasudev (2011), who estimate a process similar to Storesletten et al. (2004a) but also
46See Table 1, page 6 in their paper
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control for regional variability (in their case, at the U.S. state level) in earnings rather than just
national variability. We set the standard deviation of idiosyncratic innovations, σψ = .098 and let
the initial (fixed effect) distribution have a standard deviation of 0.5 (since the persistent compo-
nent of earning follows a random walk, a fixed effect is equivalent to households entering at age 21
with a value ψ i21 drawn from normal distribution with standard deviation 0.5). As is well known,
the variance of the transitory shock is not separately easily identified from the variance of mea-
surement error in these approaches to estimation. We set σρ = .25, which is within bounds found
by Storesletten et al. (2004b); Blundell et al. (2008) We discretize the innovations with a 3-point
distribution following Tauchen (1986).
We set the pension at 60 percent of final earnings, ζ = 0.6.
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Figure 1: Homeownership, price risk and price levels
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Figure 2: Price levels and risk
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Figure 3: Homeownership and residual price levels and volatilities
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Figure 4: LTV (AHS), price risk and price levels
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Figure 5: LTV (MIRS), price risk and price levels
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Figure 6: Histograms of city price, structure cost and land value levels
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Figure 7: Histograms of city price, structure cost and land value volatilities
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Figure 8: Price risk and levels and land share
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Figure 9: Land share and land scarcity
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Figure 10: Price risk and levels and land scarcity
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Figure 11: Homeownership, land share and land scarcity
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Figure 12: LTV, land share and land scarcity
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Apartments
Figure 13: Homeownership-price relationship by dwelling type
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Figure 14: LTV-price relationship by dwelling type
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Figure 15: Impulse responses: mean ownership, house price level and volatility
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Figure 16: Effective mortgage interest rate, price risk and price levels
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Figure 17: L-M adjusted family size profile (yearly bins)
Table 1: Invariant parameters
Parameter Description Value
β Discount factor 0.95
σ Housing’s share in utility 0.30
φ IIES 5
γ Risk Aversion 3
ty Income tax 0.20
tp Property tax 0.01
σρ Std. dev. of the idiosyncratic transitory shock 0.25
σψ Std. dev. of the idiosyncratic permanent shock 0.098
rb Interest rate on loans 6%
rl Interest rate on savings 4%
d Down payment 0.1
θb Home buyer’s transaction cost 0.08
ζ Replacement rate for pensions 0.6
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Table 2: Matched parameters
Parameter Description Mean value Interquartile range
σν Std. dev of shock to wages (corr with house prices) 0.012 0.010-0.013
σε Std. dev of idiosyncratic shock to house prices 0.022 0.015-0.025
ho Min owner-occupied house size 4 4 - 4
hr Max rental house size 8.25 8.25 - 8.25
δ j Housing maintenance 0.0112 0.012-0.010
p2000 Price level in 2000 1 0.81 - 1.09
W2000 Wage level in 2000 1 0.96 - 1.02
Price and wage levels are normalized so that prices and wages are equal to one for all cities with the average level
of land scarcity in the year 2000. The units on the house size parameters are median household earnings for 21
year olds, and these parameters are not changed across cities.
Table 3: Model fit
Data source City sample Data: 221 cities Model
Homeownership rate Census 221 0.62 0.63
Homeownership rate under 65 Census 221 0.61 0.61
Owned/rented home size ratio AHS 42 2.07 2.05
LTV AHS 42 0.84
0.71LTV (conventional loans only) AHS 42 0.80
LTV (conventional loans only) MIRS 25 0.77
This table compares key parameters in the data with the model. The first column shows the number of
cities on which the data estimates are based (see Section 2.1 for further details). The second column gives
the mean (weighted by census sample size) for the relevant variable across those cities (NB restricting
the larger samples to 25 cities has only a negligible effect on the estimated means). The AHS LTV
estimates are conditional on household characteristics (this is not trivial because of the omitted top-
coded observations); see Section 2.1 for further details and estimation procedure. We also report the
mean LTV across cities for the sample of conventional loans in the AHS. This makes it more comparable
with the LTV estimate from the MIRS (the final row), whose sample excludes non-conventional loans
(see Section 2.1).
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Table 4: Homeownership profile: data and model
Age Data source City sample Data: mean Model: mean
21-35 Census 221 0.38 0.25
36-50 Census 221 0.67 0.72
51-65 Census 221 0.76 0.88
66-75 Census 221 0.78 0.68
See notes under Table 3. This table reports mean ownership rates by age
group.
Table 5: Slopes with respect to land scarcity
age Own: Data Own: Model LTV: Data (AHS) LTV: Data (MIRS) LTV: Model
all ages -0.25** -0.20† -0.07** -0.08** -0.06†
21-35 -0.23** -0.32 -0.09** N/A -0.16
36-50 -0.24** -0.22† -0.05** N/A 0.04
51-65 -0.18** -0.09 -0.08 N/A 0.22
66-75 -0.17** -0.13† 0.02 N/A 0.00†
This table compares cross-city slopes of ownership rates and LTV with respect to land scarcity, for both the data
and model. For the data, reported coefficients are taken from cross-city OLS regressions (weighted by census
sample size) of mean ownership or LTV (for the age group in question) on land scarcity. The local ownership
and AHS LTV estimates are conditional on observed household characteristics (see Section 2.1 for estimation
procedure), but not the MIRS. Also, there is no available disaggregation of the MIRS data by age group. **
signifies that the estimate from the data is significant at the 95 percent confidence level. † signifies that the
model estimate falls within the 95 percent confidence interval of the data.
Table 6: Contribution from various elements: slopes with respect to land scarcity
Parameter Homeownership: slopes LTV: slopes
σν -0.02 -0.01
σε -0.03 -0.01
δ j -0.01 0.01
p2000 -0.23 0.02
W2000 0.04 0.00
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Table 7: Regressions of LTV on price volatilities and levels, for samples delineated by loan-limit
ratio
PANEL A: PRICE VOLATILITIES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample: loan/limit 0-0.25 0.25-0.5 0.5-0.75 0.75-1 1-1.25 1.25-1.5 >1.5
House price volatility -4.882*** -1.593*** -0.587 -0.223 -0.552 -0.767 -0.474
(1.653) (0.586) (0.392) (0.483) (0.380) (0.455) (0.863)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purchase year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,360 4,566 3,285 1,506 550 275 304
MSAs 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.051 0.020 0.007 0.008 0.055 0.099 0.169
PANEL B: PRICE LEVELS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample: loan/limit 0-0.25 0.25-0.5 0.5-0.75 0.75-1 1-1.25 1.25-1.5 >1.5
Log house price -0.388*** -0.116*** -0.042*** -0.005 -0.031* -0.042** -0.055
(0.051) (0.017) (0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.033)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purchase year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,360 4,566 3,285 1,506 550 275 304
MSAs 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.119 0.037 0.012 0.008 0.060 0.108 0.189
Regressions are run separately for samples delineated by loan-to-limit ratio (the ratio of loan size to conforming
loan limit, reported above each column). For each sample, we separately estimate the effect of price volatility
(in Panel A) and log price level (in Panel B) on household-level LTV. All regressions control for the household
characteristics listed in Section 2.1 (i.e. those used to condition the local LTV estimates), as well as a full set of
purchase year effects. We use the composite sample described in Section 2.1, though we exclude all household
with non-conventional mortgages. There are 42 MSAs in the sample. SEs, clustered by city, in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Family size equivalence scale
Family Size L-M Orshansky (1965) US Dept of Commerce F-V&K
1 100 100 100 100
2 106 126 128 134
3 128 151 157 165
4 147 189 201 197
5 169 223 237 227
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